Orient Cables (India) Limited: the full assessment
BORDERLINE. The thesis is workable but not strong. Strong numbers would have lifted this to a track on the same facts, and the numbers came back failing instead.
The case rests on the smallest part of the company: specialty power and optical fibre cable, 21% of last year's sales, which grew 155% on a block of Indian telecom work. The full read left the market for it looking as good as the first look said, and took a point off the company's edge, on one finding. The company won a great deal of new work last year and kept less money on every kilometre it sold while doing it.
At the top of the band the company asks about 57 times last year's profit, counting the shares that exist after the offer. Its own peer table runs from 26 to 64 times, so that is the upper half of the range, though the company earns the best return on net worth in that table. The price does not move the verdict either way.
What has to be true, and what we found
1. The run of telecom orders has to keep running. Specialty cable went from Rs 98 cr to Rs 250 cr in one year as telecom work replaced broadband work. The case needs that to be a build lasting three to five years, not one or two operators catching up in a single year. What we found: the sales are real and so are the approvals behind them, every one a fibre approval. But we could not find the cause. Every buyer we could identify spent less in total last year even as they laid more cable, and the programmes that would explain it are dated to 2029 and name no supplier. Both readings stay open. The June quarter cannot be multiplied by four to get a run rate either, because one customer was 38.5% of it. Holds, with a change.
2. The share of each rupee the company keeps has to come back. It kept 21.6% and 21.9% in the two earlier years and 19.7% last year. If it returns, the volume turns into profit growth. What we found: it does not come back. It settles near 19.5% to 20.5% and more likely drifts down. Of the 2.2 points lost, about 0.7 is what four audited peers lost too and about 1.6 points is this company's alone. That part cannot be explained, now or later: the audited accounts say the company has no reportable business segments, so the product-level detail that would settle it exists nowhere. Does not hold.
3. The main business has to carry the story without breaking. Networking cable is 78% of sales and has to grow with its market while specialty grows faster. What we found: it carries the story, but this is one business, not two. The end customer is the same and two customers are more than half of the June quarter. Broadband sales fell in absolute rupees last year, in a year when India's fixed broadband lines grew 12.4%, and telecom work replaced them. The 22.9% market share the filing advertises is about 18% measured like for like. The customer book is durable and getting narrower. Holds, with a change.
4. The new machines have to earn as well as the old ones. Rs 92 cr of the fresh money buys machinery. What we found: the record says they will not. Over three years the company put in Rs 10.56 of new capital for every rupee of new operating profit, and return on capital fell from 41.1% to 23.8%. The plant that makes the entire specialty line already runs at 64.7% of capacity, so the money relieves no constraint on the business that is growing. About a third of the list, Rs 31 cr, is solar equipment in substance against no solar sales today, and no optical fibre machine appears anywhere in its 36 lines, so the fresh money buys no capacity in the only part of the company that scores well. Does not hold.
The market and the edge, after the full read
The market: 4 at the first look, 4 after the full read. The part of the market this company sells into is worth about Rs 9,600 cr and grows 12% to 15% a year, a bit faster than the economy. What earns the 4 is space rather than speed: the company holds about 2.6% of it, so nothing constrains it for a decade, and it grew its volumes 110% to 130% in a year when that market was flat to falling. It stays at 4 rather than 5 because that score needs years of share gain and there is one year and one quarter of it. One first-look error is corrected here: copper rose about 21% last year, not the roughly flat reading one of the two first-look notes had used.
The edge: 4 at the first look, 3 after the full read. The winning is real and so is the keeping. The company holds six fibre type approvals from BSNL plus railway, defence, European and American marks, a customer has to audit its plant for six months before buying, and no large customer left in the last four reporting periods. What costs it the point is that none of this reaches what the company keeps. Spread per kilometre rose less than every one of four audited peers, and profit per kilometre fell 6.3% in the year the volume arrived, the only one of five companies in this trade whose profit per unit fell. When copper and glass rose, the company recovered only 70% to 84% of the move from its customers.
The main business: 3 and 3, unchanged. It has genuinely taken share and holds the first and only Indian licence for one data cable standard. But that standard is voluntary, the marks customers actually ask for are held by four rivals for the same cable, and it already has roughly a quarter of what it sells into. Birla Cable grew faster last year on exactly this product at nearly twice the profit margin.
The numbers
| FY24 | FY25 | FY26 | What it means | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue, Rs cr | 658 | 825 | 1,172 | Up 42% last year, and a good part of that is the copper price, not more cable |
| Share of each rupee kept | 21.6% | 21.9% | 19.7% | The 2.2 point fall is the profit problem; about 1.6 points of it cannot be explained |
| Profit, Rs cr | 40 | 53 | 54 | Flat on 42% more revenue, and all of the small rise is one-off credits |
| Profit per kilometre, Rs | 1,464 | 1,851 | 1,736 | Down 6.3% in the year the volume arrived; four peers rose 30% to 37% |
| Return on capital | 41.1% | 36.5% | 23.8% | Capital employed nearly tripled while operating profit rose 55% |
| Net debt to equity | 0.23 | 0.63 | 0.94 | Borrowing funded the growth; the offer repays about 60% of it |
Profit cannot grow faster than sales here. The only costs that could create that effect, true fixed overhead and depreciation, are together about 1.9% of revenue, so doubling sales on a flat base would add about one point of margin, and depreciation is going the other way. Filling the idle capacity adds rupees and not margin, because the profit on the next kilometre is the same as the average. This business converts copper at a roughly constant percentage and should be read that way, not as a margin story.
Last year's profit growth is one-off credits. A Rs 2.9 cr write-back of old supplier balances and Rs 1.7 cr of duty drawback from nothing, together 5.1 times the Rs 0.9 cr rise in profit before tax. Strip them out and profit before tax fell 2.8% on 42% more revenue, and they will not repeat: in the two prior years the company wrote such balances off rather than back. None of this says the profit is manufactured. The credits are 6.3% of last year's profit before tax and the underlying profit is there. What failed is the growth and the direction.
Cash has been behind profit, and the nearest rival had the same year. Over three years the business turned Rs 147 cr of profit into Rs 6 cr of operating cash, and free cash flow was negative Rs 160 cr, so the expansion cannot be funded from its own cash. Both sides belong here: growing a copper converter absorbs cash in working capital, and Birla Cable also ran negative operating cash flow last year. We do not count this against the company and it is not a reason for the verdict.
Governance, promoters and the offer
What is clean. The audited accounts carry no qualification and no restatement beyond Rs 0.1 cr. No promoter share is pledged. Dealings with related parties are 0.7% of revenue and the receivables ageing improved every year. The auditor change was benign, with clean opinions either side. The offer is 58% fresh money, with 36 itemised objects, named vendors, a three year schedule and an outside agency monitoring each item, nothing going to insiders and no bridge loan. The founders sell 8.4% of their own holding and keep about 82%.
What to watch.
- The company's own name is in court. Orient Electric is suing for a permanent injunction against the use of ORIENT in the corporate name, trade name and website, with hearings on 13 November and 2 December 2026 and the company's own appeal already dismissed. The money claimed is small at Rs 2 cr. The name is not: it carries all Rs 1,172 cr of revenue and every product approval the edge rests on. Only 2 of 22 trademark entries are registered and none is ORIENT. Nobody has put a number on it and no provision is made.
- What the company told its lenders did not match its books. At last year end it reported receivables of Rs 287 cr to lenders against Rs 252 cr in its own accounts, a Rs 35 cr difference, 64.8% of a year's profit. The filing gives reasons in a risk factor the auditor's annexure leaves out, and no single named cause bridges it. A similar Rs 14 cr difference three years earlier predates the explanation offered. Remediation is described as in process rather than complete, and the auditor notes the audit trail was not switched on at database level.
- Two customers, and a disclosure that cannot be right. One customer ran 25.8% to 38.6% of revenue in all four periods and two were 53.3% of the June quarter, on purchase orders with no long term contract. No customer is named anywhere, and the risk factor and the audited note cannot both be right on one definition of a customer.
- Two places the filing contradicts itself. One page says no founder left any other firm in the last three years; the next prints the table showing one of them left Orient International on 31 March 2025. And the business chapter says cost increases were passed on to customers, where the audited note says profitability fell because of raw material prices and mix.
- Rs 8.7 cr of machinery bought from a founder's own firm in FY25, the asset named nowhere in 491 pages and no valuation shown, inside the same pool of assets the loans now being repaid had funded. We could not establish this as improper and could not clear it either. Both founders also personally guarantee every facility, the guarantees are not released, and about 60% of what they secure is retired with the public's money.
The trust dial: qualified. We take the audited numbers at face value. What we do not take at face value is what the company reports outside those accounts and what its own chapters say about itself: the figures given to lenders, the customer disclosure, the pass-through claim, the paid-for report's fibre share claim supported by copper credentials, an unexplained Rs 36 cr "Others" line in the June quarter, and the contradicted founder confirmation.
The five grades
| Block | Grade | In one line |
|---|---|---|
| The market | PASS, 4 of 5 | Grows a bit faster than the economy, and the company holds 2.6% of it |
| Right to win | MARGINAL, 3 of 5 | The winning and the keeping are real; neither reaches what the company keeps per kilometre |
| Financials | FAIL | All of last year's growth is one-off credits, and the profit lines moved the wrong way in the year the volume arrived |
| The people and the record | MARGINAL | The corporate name is in court and carries everything; what was reported to lenders did not match the books |
| The money and the shareholding | MARGINAL | Repaying revolving working capital debt is the main object, and no fibre machine is in the capex list |
What would move the level. Strong numbers alone would lift this to a track on the same facts, which means the share of each rupee kept returning toward 21.5% with the volume held. A 5 on the market or the edge would do it too, and the edge needs years of share gain rather than one. The last two grades can only kill: either failing, on the name case or on what was reported to the lenders, would make this a kill whatever the thesis.
What would change the answer, and when
- The first reported quarter and the listing outcome. Specialty sales at or below last year's Rs 250 cr breaks the first claim. The share of each rupee kept at or below 19.5%, with copper flat or falling, confirms the second has gone for good.
- Whether broadband sales keep falling in rupees while telecom carries both lines, which is the test of whether this is one business or two, and whether the next year adds capital at the same Rs 10.56 per rupee of new operating profit.
- The hearings on 13 November and 2 December 2026 in the name case.
- What the Rs 36 cr "Others" line in the June quarter actually is. It is bigger in one quarter than in all of last year and is explained nowhere. It is not exports and not solar. Most likely government, railway and defence fibre buyers on approvals the table has no row for.
Read from the red herring prospectus of 21 September 2026, the audited and June 2026 interim accounts inside it, the filings and results of eight listed rivals, and public market and regulator data. Company and consultant figures are as stated in the filing. Assessed 13 October 2026, after the offer closed on 29 September 2026 and before listing.
Process version 3.2.