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Mainboard · RHP filed 2026-09-21

Orient Cables (India) Limited

BORDERLINE Assessed 12 Oct 2026 · process v3.2

Borderline, landed TRACK. Re-check at first results.

Rs 258–272 a share · bids were taken 25–29 September 2026, so the offer has already closed · Rs 552 crore raised: Rs 320 crore fresh, Rs 232 crore sold by the founding family

First look · 12 Oct 2026

A Delhi-headquartered, family-owned maker of data and telecom cable, running two plants in Bhiwadi in Rajasthan and a new one in Bengaluru, selling mostly to broadband and telecom companies in India.

The bearings

Market value at the top of the band
About Rs 3,095 crore
Price against last year's profit
About 57 times last year's profit, counting the shares that exist after the offer. The filing's own peer list runs from 26 to 64 times, plus one loss-making name at 708 times. Its return on net worth, 25.8%, is the highest in that list
Fresh money against shares sold by holders
Rs 320 crore fresh (58%), Rs 232 crore sold by the founding family (42%). Two family trusts and two family members sell, each parting with 5% to 10% of what it holds, at a cost of about one paisa a share
What the fresh money does
Rs 155.5 crore repays borrowings, about 60% of the debt. Rs 91.5 crore buys machines and builds. The rest, up to a quarter of the raise, is unallocated
Family holding
99.99% before the offer, about 82% after. There was no outside shareholder at all before it
Last private price
There is none. No share has changed hands in three years and no outside investor has ever bought in, so there is nothing to compare the band with
Latest full year
Revenue Rs 1,172 crore, up 42%. Profit Rs 54 crore, flat. Materials went from 79.5% to 81.8% of sales and the profit margin fell to 4.6%
Lead managers
IIFL Capital Services and JM Financial

What the company sells

Networking cable

78% of revenue · +26% last year

The copper cable that carries data — CAT5e, CAT6 and CAT6A network cable, CCTV and coaxial cable, and patch cords — sold to broadband and telecom companies and through resellers, almost all of it in India.

The market3/5

The market for this cable in India is about Rs 4,600 crore and has actually been growing about 15% a year, against the 19% the company's own paid-for research expects. The company has genuinely taken share in it, from about 17% of domestic sales two years ago to about 23%, and that is the strongest thing in its favour. What holds the score down is that there is not much room left: it already has roughly a quarter of the market it sells into, and even the capacity the offer funds would cap all its cable sales below twice last year's. The demand check is also weaker than the research needs — the telecom regulator's own count of fixed broadband lines grew 12% last year, not 19%, and the fast-growing alternative needs no cable to the home at all. Copper prices rose 22% to 27% last year and are most of the cost of cable, so a good part of the 26% growth is metal rather than more cable.

Right to win3/5

Two things are real. The company holds the first and still the only Indian licence for one data-cable standard, granted by the standards bureau in August 2024, and the bureau invited it to help write that standard. And it keeps its customers: none of its large ones left in the last four reporting periods, more than half its sales come from accounts a decade old, and in June 2026 it set up an equal joint venture with the owner of CP PLUS to make network and CCTV cable. What stops this being stronger is that the licence is for a standard nobody is obliged to meet, while the marks customers actually ask for are already held by Finolex, Birla Cable, Sterlite and D-Link for the same cable. The six-month approval the company leans on is a cost of entry rather than a barrier. And a rival did better last year: Birla Cable's sales rose 17% on what it called historically high sales of exactly this cable, and its June quarter rose 51% at nearly twice this company's profit margin.

Specialty power and optical fibre cable

21% of revenue, and 31% in the June quarter · +155% last year, after falling 10% the year before

Low-voltage power cable, shielded instrumentation and control cable, and optical fibre cable, sold into India's telecom and broadband building programme. This is also where the new solar and electron-beam work sits.

The market4/5

This market is somewhere between Rs 4,800 crore and Rs 14,350 crore, growing about 12% to 15% a year, comfortably ahead of the economy, and the company holds under 3% of it — so there is a great deal of room. The room counts because the company is visibly taking it: this line grew 155% last year and about 144% in the June quarter, while the listed cable makers it competes with grew 16% to 28%. It is not a 5 for two reasons. That is one year of gain, not several. And the filing never splits this line between power cable and optical fibre, which matters: if it is mostly fibre, the market is an oversupplied one running at under half its capacity and the score would be 3. The solar market the company points to was given no weight — on the research's own numbers it would be bigger than the whole Indian fibre market, and the solar work earned nothing at all last year.

Right to win4/5

The edge is approvals plus old relationships, and both are documented. It holds six named type approvals from BSNL for particular fibre cables, a railway research approval, telecom equipment certification, five standards-bureau licences and European marks for both fibre and power cable. Winning a customer means a plant audit and sample testing abroad, about six months. It has designed two cable specifications jointly with customers, one a braided cable it has supplied for over ten years to a telecom equipment maker listed in New York. The growth bears this out and it was not one lucky tender: customers of more than ten years' standing doubled what they bought and supplied 92% of last year's growth, and the second to fifth largest accounts gave half the growth between them. It is not a 5 because eight to ten named rivals hold the same certificates, the company owns no patents at all, and its research staff numbered four and then none. The electron-beam machine it calls its technology is simply for sale: the filing's own quotation prices two of them at Rs 17 crore from a Chinese supplier, and a rival has run such machines since 2011.

Wire harnesses and electric-vehicle charging guns

0.01% of revenue · started last year

Bundled and terminated cable assemblies, and the cable and gun used to charge an electric vehicle, made by a subsidiary set up in May 2025.

The market3/5

Charging cable, plugs and guns for electric vehicles is a small Indian market of roughly Rs 425 crore to Rs 570 crore, but it is growing 28% to 34% a year, and public charging points went from about 5,000 to nearly 53,000 by July 2026, most of them of the type this gun is built for. That growth is the whole of this score. The room earns nothing, because the company sells almost none of it: this line was Rs 15 lakh of sales last year, a hundredth of one percent of the business. Harness assembly, the other half of the line, is a much bigger market but grows under 4% a year.

Right to win1/5

Nothing here stands up. There is no customer, no order and no contract anywhere in the filing: the supply arrangement is described as proposed, to an unnamed vehicle maker under an unnamed multinational, and the gun is proposed to be made in-house. The subsidiary that would make it has not begun trading, lost Rs 89 lakh in the June quarter alone and has negative net worth. The certificate the filing says it holds for the charging cable does not appear in either of its two certificate schedules or in its list of approvals; the only entry from that certifier is a provisional test letter for solar cable, written against solar standards. The usual automotive quality standard appears nowhere in the 491 pages. Meanwhile Polycab already sells both common charging guns and harnesses on Rs 22,400 crore of sales, and Motherson's wiring business holds over 40% of Indian vehicle harness.

Other allied products

0.4% of revenue · +151% last year

Mainly keystone jacks — the socket a network cable plugs into — plus power strips and power cords, sold through the same resellers that buy the cable.

The market3/5

The company's paid-for research puts the Indian market for these sockets at Rs 1,090 crore growing about 10% to 12% a year, roughly the pace of the economy, and that moderate growth is the whole score. The company has 0.4% of it and nothing shows it winning any. The size does not stand up to a cross-check: it would make India about 30% of the world market for these sockets while being about 7% of world spending on the cabling they go into, and on the independent world growth rate this would score 2. Last year's 151% growth was four-fifths price rather than more pieces, and the June quarter annualises almost a third below last year.

Right to win2/5

Two things are real and neither is a barrier. It sells through the same resellers that buy its cable, where it keeps 94% of its fifty largest customers and its ten largest have been with it nine years, and faceplates are drawing orders from existing cable customers. It also holds an American safety certificate for one jack. But a jack is chosen off a specification sheet or a reseller's shelf, so the channel does not decide the sale; the six-month approval that protects the cable does not carry over; every competitor holds the same certificate; and it covers the older grade, while the machine the offer funds makes the newer one, where Polycab already sells a better-specified product. The real concern runs the other way: the offer funds a 243% rise in capacity on a line running at 6% of capacity, which the filing concedes is for strategic reasons despite the spare capacity, and Rs 4.9 crore of that money actually buys a solar junction-box line for a product with no sales at all.

Nothing is left out — the filing reports only these four lines. One thing is not scored here: a solar junction-box line that the offer part-funds has no sales and no separate disclosure anywhere in the document.

The numbers that matter

MeasureFY24FY25FY26Jun 2026 qtrReads
Cable made (km)401,769452,943555,329159,081Up 23% last year while sales rose 42%, so the rest was price and a heavier product mix
Value per km of cable (Rs)16,37218,21421,09930,748Our calculation. Rising as the heavier specialty and fibre cable takes a bigger share
How much of the plant is used74.4%80.8%69.9%71.0%Fell in the year sales grew 42%: capacity was added ahead of demand
Share of sales to telecom companies13.7%13.2%32.5%43.2%The clearest forward signal in the document, and the same fact as the concentration below
Share of sales to broadband companies50.3%57.3%39.2%30.1%Fell in rupees too, by Rs 13 crore, in a year India added 12% more fixed broadband lines
Largest customer, share of sales38.6%29.3%25.8%38.5%That customer bought Rs 188 crore in the June quarter against Rs 302 crore in all of last year
Ten largest customers, share of sales71.8%74.8%76.5%84.0%Rising right through, so the growth is concentrating rather than broadening
Sales kept from last year's top fifty customers99.7%98.8%93.9%93.8%Slipping three years running while sales accelerate
Borrowings against yearly operating profit0.491.362.314.67The growth is being funded with debt. Working-capital days tripled in two years

Checked in the filing

What happens next

This is the quick read on the market and the edge. The offer closed on 29 September, so it is a read on the business rather than on the offer. The full assessment — the numbers, the people and the record, and the shape of the offer — runs on your word and is added to this page when it is done.

Full assessment · 12 Oct 2026

Orient Cables (India) Limited: the full assessment

BORDERLINE. The thesis is workable but not strong. Strong numbers would have lifted this to a track on the same facts, and the numbers came back failing instead.

The case rests on the smallest part of the company: specialty power and optical fibre cable, 21% of last year's sales, which grew 155% on a block of Indian telecom work. The full read left the market for it looking as good as the first look said, and took a point off the company's edge, on one finding. The company won a great deal of new work last year and kept less money on every kilometre it sold while doing it.

At the top of the band the company asks about 57 times last year's profit, counting the shares that exist after the offer. Its own peer table runs from 26 to 64 times, so that is the upper half of the range, though the company earns the best return on net worth in that table. The price does not move the verdict either way.

What has to be true, and what we found

1. The run of telecom orders has to keep running. Specialty cable went from Rs 98 cr to Rs 250 cr in one year as telecom work replaced broadband work. The case needs that to be a build lasting three to five years, not one or two operators catching up in a single year. What we found: the sales are real and so are the approvals behind them, every one a fibre approval. But we could not find the cause. Every buyer we could identify spent less in total last year even as they laid more cable, and the programmes that would explain it are dated to 2029 and name no supplier. Both readings stay open. The June quarter cannot be multiplied by four to get a run rate either, because one customer was 38.5% of it. Holds, with a change.

2. The share of each rupee the company keeps has to come back. It kept 21.6% and 21.9% in the two earlier years and 19.7% last year. If it returns, the volume turns into profit growth. What we found: it does not come back. It settles near 19.5% to 20.5% and more likely drifts down. Of the 2.2 points lost, about 0.7 is what four audited peers lost too and about 1.6 points is this company's alone. That part cannot be explained, now or later: the audited accounts say the company has no reportable business segments, so the product-level detail that would settle it exists nowhere. Does not hold.

3. The main business has to carry the story without breaking. Networking cable is 78% of sales and has to grow with its market while specialty grows faster. What we found: it carries the story, but this is one business, not two. The end customer is the same and two customers are more than half of the June quarter. Broadband sales fell in absolute rupees last year, in a year when India's fixed broadband lines grew 12.4%, and telecom work replaced them. The 22.9% market share the filing advertises is about 18% measured like for like. The customer book is durable and getting narrower. Holds, with a change.

4. The new machines have to earn as well as the old ones. Rs 92 cr of the fresh money buys machinery. What we found: the record says they will not. Over three years the company put in Rs 10.56 of new capital for every rupee of new operating profit, and return on capital fell from 41.1% to 23.8%. The plant that makes the entire specialty line already runs at 64.7% of capacity, so the money relieves no constraint on the business that is growing. About a third of the list, Rs 31 cr, is solar equipment in substance against no solar sales today, and no optical fibre machine appears anywhere in its 36 lines, so the fresh money buys no capacity in the only part of the company that scores well. Does not hold.

The market and the edge, after the full read

The market: 4 at the first look, 4 after the full read. The part of the market this company sells into is worth about Rs 9,600 cr and grows 12% to 15% a year, a bit faster than the economy. What earns the 4 is space rather than speed: the company holds about 2.6% of it, so nothing constrains it for a decade, and it grew its volumes 110% to 130% in a year when that market was flat to falling. It stays at 4 rather than 5 because that score needs years of share gain and there is one year and one quarter of it. One first-look error is corrected here: copper rose about 21% last year, not the roughly flat reading one of the two first-look notes had used.

The edge: 4 at the first look, 3 after the full read. The winning is real and so is the keeping. The company holds six fibre type approvals from BSNL plus railway, defence, European and American marks, a customer has to audit its plant for six months before buying, and no large customer left in the last four reporting periods. What costs it the point is that none of this reaches what the company keeps. Spread per kilometre rose less than every one of four audited peers, and profit per kilometre fell 6.3% in the year the volume arrived, the only one of five companies in this trade whose profit per unit fell. When copper and glass rose, the company recovered only 70% to 84% of the move from its customers.

The main business: 3 and 3, unchanged. It has genuinely taken share and holds the first and only Indian licence for one data cable standard. But that standard is voluntary, the marks customers actually ask for are held by four rivals for the same cable, and it already has roughly a quarter of what it sells into. Birla Cable grew faster last year on exactly this product at nearly twice the profit margin.

The numbers

FY24 FY25 FY26 What it means
Revenue, Rs cr6588251,172Up 42% last year, and a good part of that is the copper price, not more cable
Share of each rupee kept21.6%21.9%19.7%The 2.2 point fall is the profit problem; about 1.6 points of it cannot be explained
Profit, Rs cr405354Flat on 42% more revenue, and all of the small rise is one-off credits
Profit per kilometre, Rs1,4641,8511,736Down 6.3% in the year the volume arrived; four peers rose 30% to 37%
Return on capital41.1%36.5%23.8%Capital employed nearly tripled while operating profit rose 55%
Net debt to equity0.230.630.94Borrowing funded the growth; the offer repays about 60% of it

Profit cannot grow faster than sales here. The only costs that could create that effect, true fixed overhead and depreciation, are together about 1.9% of revenue, so doubling sales on a flat base would add about one point of margin, and depreciation is going the other way. Filling the idle capacity adds rupees and not margin, because the profit on the next kilometre is the same as the average. This business converts copper at a roughly constant percentage and should be read that way, not as a margin story.

Last year's profit growth is one-off credits. A Rs 2.9 cr write-back of old supplier balances and Rs 1.7 cr of duty drawback from nothing, together 5.1 times the Rs 0.9 cr rise in profit before tax. Strip them out and profit before tax fell 2.8% on 42% more revenue, and they will not repeat: in the two prior years the company wrote such balances off rather than back. None of this says the profit is manufactured. The credits are 6.3% of last year's profit before tax and the underlying profit is there. What failed is the growth and the direction.

Cash has been behind profit, and the nearest rival had the same year. Over three years the business turned Rs 147 cr of profit into Rs 6 cr of operating cash, and free cash flow was negative Rs 160 cr, so the expansion cannot be funded from its own cash. Both sides belong here: growing a copper converter absorbs cash in working capital, and Birla Cable also ran negative operating cash flow last year. We do not count this against the company and it is not a reason for the verdict.

Governance, promoters and the offer

What is clean. The audited accounts carry no qualification and no restatement beyond Rs 0.1 cr. No promoter share is pledged. Dealings with related parties are 0.7% of revenue and the receivables ageing improved every year. The auditor change was benign, with clean opinions either side. The offer is 58% fresh money, with 36 itemised objects, named vendors, a three year schedule and an outside agency monitoring each item, nothing going to insiders and no bridge loan. The founders sell 8.4% of their own holding and keep about 82%.

What to watch.

The trust dial: qualified. We take the audited numbers at face value. What we do not take at face value is what the company reports outside those accounts and what its own chapters say about itself: the figures given to lenders, the customer disclosure, the pass-through claim, the paid-for report's fibre share claim supported by copper credentials, an unexplained Rs 36 cr "Others" line in the June quarter, and the contradicted founder confirmation.

The five grades

Block Grade In one line
The marketPASS, 4 of 5Grows a bit faster than the economy, and the company holds 2.6% of it
Right to winMARGINAL, 3 of 5The winning and the keeping are real; neither reaches what the company keeps per kilometre
FinancialsFAILAll of last year's growth is one-off credits, and the profit lines moved the wrong way in the year the volume arrived
The people and the recordMARGINALThe corporate name is in court and carries everything; what was reported to lenders did not match the books
The money and the shareholdingMARGINALRepaying revolving working capital debt is the main object, and no fibre machine is in the capex list

What would move the level. Strong numbers alone would lift this to a track on the same facts, which means the share of each rupee kept returning toward 21.5% with the volume held. A 5 on the market or the edge would do it too, and the edge needs years of share gain rather than one. The last two grades can only kill: either failing, on the name case or on what was reported to the lenders, would make this a kill whatever the thesis.

What would change the answer, and when

Read from the red herring prospectus of 21 September 2026, the audited and June 2026 interim accounts inside it, the filings and results of eight listed rivals, and public market and regulator data. Company and consultant figures are as stated in the filing. Assessed 13 October 2026, after the offer closed on 29 September 2026 and before listing.

Process version 3.2.