Mainboard · RHP filed 2026-09-20
Moneyview Limited
Worth the full assessment, because the faster half of the business — the loans it funds itself — scores 4 out of 5 on its market and 3 out of 5 on its right to win, though the bigger half lost share last year.
Rs 32–34 a share · bids were taken 24–28 September 2026 and the shares listed on 1 October · about Rs 1,092 crore raised: Rs 750 crore fresh, Rs 342 crore sold by existing holders
Moneyview runs an app that arranges small unsecured personal loans for middle-income Indians, mostly in smaller cities: it finds the borrower and scores them, 22 banks and finance companies put up three-quarters of the money, and its own lending company funds the rest.
The bearings
- Market value at the top of the band
- About Rs 5,985 crore
- Price against last year's profit
- About 22 times. The filing's own peer list runs from 17 to 213 times. About 15 times if you leave out a one-time charge of Rs 207 crore
- Fresh money against shares sold by holders
- Rs 750 crore fresh (69%), Rs 342 crore sold by holders (31%). Most investors trimmed about 7% of what they held; Crimson Winter sold 21% of its stake and is the only seller whose average cost, Rs 37.42 a share, is above the top of the band
- What the fresh money does
- Rs 325 crore backs the cover it gives partner lenders against defaults, Rs 250 crore goes into its own lender's capital, the rest is unallocated and capped at a quarter of the raise
- Founder and family holding
- 23.96% before the offer, about 19.3% after. That is below the 20% the rules require to be locked in, so Accel, Tiger Global and Ribbit lock up shares of their own to fill the gap
- Last private price
- Rs 64.15 a share, paid in a Rs 38.6 crore placement in September 2024. The top of the band is about 53% of that
- Latest full year
- Revenue Rs 3,351 crore, up 43%. Profit Rs 243 crore, up 1% — or Rs 397 crore and up 65% before a Rs 160 crore one-time payment to the founder and a Rs 47 crore loss to a cyber attack
- Loans it services
- Rs 22,520 crore at 30 June 2026, up 27%. A quarter of that sits on its own books
- Lead managers
- Axis Capital, BofA Securities India, IIFL Capital Services, Kotak Mahindra Capital
What the company sells
Fees on loans that partner banks and finance companies fund
A fee from a bank or finance company for finding the borrower, checking them, signing them up and then collecting the instalments on a loan the partner's own money funds. The typical loan is Rs 96,000 over 23 months for someone with a credit record, or Rs 20,000 over eight months for someone without one.
Arranging these loans through an app is a big and fast-growing market: about Rs 2.2 lakh crore of lending last year, expected to grow 26 to 27% a year for the next five, as the same borrowing moves off branch counters and onto phones. The company paid for the report that sizes it, so the figure was checked against an industry body's own data, which lands within a tenth of it. What holds this down is that the company did not keep up: its own prospectus says its share of this lending fell from about 11% to about 10.5% last year, the volume it earns this fee on grew only 18%, and two smaller rivals grew their books by 63% and 73%. The June quarter turned sharply the other way, with volume up 84%, but it won that volume at a lower fee.
One real strength: it finds and collects from these borrowers better than the industry does. Losses across everything it arranges fell from 7.9% to 7.0% over three years while an industry comparison rose from 7.8% to 8.3%, and two other measures agree — bounced payments down from 7.9% to 6.4%, loans slipping a month down from 2.2% to 1.4%. The cost of finding a borrower almost halved, and nine of its 22 lending partners have stayed more than five years with none leaving in three. But it is not especially hard to copy: three Indian suppliers sell this kind of credit scoring off the shelf, one large rival buys it, two others build their own, and every rival its size already owns a lending company too. What cannot be bought is its own three years of repayment records at this scale.
Interest on loans it funds itself
The same borrower and the same app, but the company owns the loan through its own lending company. It earns about 27.6% from the borrower, pays 14.7% for the money, and carries every rupee of the loss itself.
This is the best-measured market of the four. Unsecured personal loans held on digital lenders' own books are a book of about Rs 1.54 lakh crore growing 28% a year on an industry body's figures, which agrees within a tenth with the company's own paid-for report — two independent sources pointing the same way, which none of the other lines gets. The company grew this book 65% a year for two years while the market grew 25 to 28%. It is not a 5 because the growth is slowing hard, from 93% to 42% to 24% year on year, so the latest quarter is behind the market, and because the two years of gain came from moving its own lending onto its own balance sheet rather than from winning new borrowers. There is a lot of room left, but reaching it needs capital the lending arm does not earn: about Rs 320 crore a year against the Rs 150 crore it made, and the Rs 250 crore from the offer buys roughly one year.
The same strength in finding and collecting, plus two things specific to owning the lender: it could take on loans its partners would not fund and hand them back when they would, and it has a funnel of 140 million app sign-ups a standalone lender would have to pay for. The borrower comes for access rather than price — credit at all, at a bigger loan or longer term than a credit score alone allows, approved in seconds by a lender already on their phone. It is not price: no borrower interest rate appears anywhere in the 537 pages, and the rate it earns stayed near 27.6% while its cost of finding borrowers nearly halved, so the saving was kept rather than passed on. Slightly weaker than the fee line, because the app funnel is beaten by Paytm and PhonePe, the 14.7% it pays for money is a permanent handicap against Bajaj Finance, and the one place its underwriting is fully on its own account — bad loans of 2.7% on its own book — sits above the 2.1% of the market it lends into.
Gains on selling loans on to other lenders
Selling bundles of loans off its own books to other lenders and booking the gain. It is a way of funding the lending book rather than a business it sells to anyone.
The market that matters here is not lending but buying loan bundles, and it grew only 5 to 9% last year — at or below the pace of the economy — with the growth going into vehicle loans. What this company sells, bundles of unsecured personal loans, is the one the central bank made 25 percentage points dearer to hold in 2023 and the one where bad loans are expected to peak; nobody sizes that corner at all. Three things cap the line anyway: it can only sell what it lends, so even selling its whole book every year would cap this near Rs 226 crore; selling swaps a steady lending margin for a one-off gain, so it only pays when money is tight; and the buyer sets the price. Neither use of the offer money funds it and both reduce the reason for it.
Credit cards, insurance, gold, home loans, payments and four more
Eight products added since 2024, almost all of them selling someone else's product to people the app already has: credit cards, salary advances, home loans and loans against property, health and motor insurance, digital gold, a fixed-deposit marketplace, payments and bill payments.
The decisive fact is not silence but a statement: the company says in its own management discussion that revenue from all eight together was not material last year, the year before, and in both June quarters. Two years and eight launches on, none of it has grown out of immateriality, and that is a ceiling the company set itself. Its partner list shows why: 17 of the 26 non-lending partners are home-loan institutions, the slowest market of the group at 6 to 8% a year, while three partners between them cover insurance, gold and deposits. The pool is real — 128 million people have registered and never bought anything, and the cost of reaching them is already spent — but nothing shows any of it being won. The partner count rising from 1 to 26 is an input, the share of users who buy something gained a flat 1.2 points a year straight through the launches, and the chart the company drew to show these products catching on has no numbers on it.
Also on the books and not scored: the interest it earns on the cash it must pledge to partner lenders as cover against defaults — Rs 42 crore, 1% of revenue. It is the yield on money it has to park, not a business.
The numbers that matter
| Measure | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 | Jun 2026 qtr | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loans it services (Rs crore) | 12,885 | 16,715 | 21,380 | 22,520 | Up 27% on a year earlier |
| Of that, on its own books (Rs crore) | 2,037 | 3,933 | 5,571 | 5,657 | A quarter of the total, and the share stopped rising last quarter |
| Its share of app-arranged personal lending | — | about 11% | about 10.5% | — | The company's own figures. This is the fall that holds the fee line's market score to 3 |
| Repeat borrowers as a share of the book | 42.1% | 52.9% | 60.9% | 62.7% | Cheaper business, but a personal loan is repaid and gone, so it is not a lock-in |
| Cost of finding a borrower, as a share of money lent | 2.92% | 2.42% | 1.90% | 1.71% | Nearly halved. The saving was kept as margin, not passed to the borrower |
| Losses across everything it arranges | 7.93% | 7.07% | 6.95% | 6.90% | Improving, against an industry comparison that worsened. The main evidence of a real strength |
| Bad loans on its own book | 0.94% | 1.88% | 2.74% | 2.72% | Tripled in two years, and above the 2.1% of the market it lends into. The one place the loss is entirely its own |
| Cover pledged to partners, against its own net worth | 28.4% | 36.9% | 41.4% | 43.9% | Rises every period. Rs 325 crore of the fresh money feeds it |
Checked in the filing
- clearFounder shares pledged. None pledged or otherwise tied up.
- clearAuditor. Same auditor throughout the last three years.
- clearRecord of the founders. No case against any founder on any head, and both clean-record confirmations are in the document.
- flagMoney paid to the founders. Rs 160 crore was paid to the founder and chief executive in March 2026 as a one-time reward, approved by the board and by shareholders. It is why reported profit was flat in a year revenue grew 43%. Related-party dealings came to 5.35% of revenue.
- notedFounder holding floor. The founders hold too little to meet the 20% that must be locked in after listing, so Accel, Tiger Global and Ribbit lock up shares of their own instead.
- notedCyber incident. Attackers took Rs 47 crore out of the lending arm's bank account in August 2025. A police case and recovery claims are running; Rs 0.23 crore has come back.
- notedProceedings involving directors. A 2021 notice from the Enforcement Directorate against one director over alleged foreign-exchange breaches at a former employer, unrelated to this company, and one pending tax matter against another.
- notedWhat the borrower pays. No borrower interest rate, range or annual rate appears anywhere in the 537 pages, on either product.
- notedDisclosure of the newer products. No revenue, book or customer count for any product other than the personal loan; the company states their revenue was not material.
What happens next
This is the quick read on the market and the edge. The full assessment — the numbers, the people and the record, and the shape of the offer — runs on your word and is added to this page when it is done.
Read from the red herring prospectus of 20 September 2026 (537 pages, by section), with outside research on the markets, the rules and the rivals. Market sizes the company paid a consultant for were checked against an industry body's own figures. Nothing published after the offer closed was used as evidence.