Why:
- Governance: the promoter is personally named in a ₹21.27 crore fake-invoicing case, and the company at the centre of it is Injecto's landlord, its largest related-party customer and the security for its bank loans. The tax intelligence directorate has issued a show cause notice after a search, naming group company Hind Polyfabs Private Limited as Noticee No. 1 and Ramesh Kumar Rateria, Injecto's Chairman and Managing Director, as Noticee No. 2, and asking why a penalty should not be imposed on him personally (T1, RHP p.285). It alleges that Hind Polyfabs issued invoices and transport documents for plastic granules across the five years to March 2025 without the goods actually moving, passing ₹21.27 crore of input tax credit to fifteen recipient companies. A second notice of ₹5.32 crore names another family company and the promoter's son, who owns 1.5% of Injecto and personally guarantees its bank debt (T1, RHP p.284). ₹65 lakh has been deposited across the two while the investigation ran. Nothing has been decided: no order, no appeal, no finding of fraud anywhere. What makes this the company's problem and not only the family's is that the noticed entity leases Injecto the plant holding 2,400 MT of its 10,870 MT of capacity (T1, RHP p.148), owns the property mortgaged for Injecto's bank lines, and in the year before this filing became Injecto's largest related-party customer: sales to it went from ₹66.92 lakh to ₹1,059.79 lakh, a rise of 15.8 times, while purchases from it fell 88% to ₹2.3 crore (T1, RHP p.236). The commodity, the counterparties and the building are the same. The filing explains neither movement. We state the arithmetic and the silence, and claim nothing about why.
- Cash: operations have taken money out in each of the last three years, and this offer does not fund the hole. Operating cash flow was negative ₹13.0 crore, negative ₹16.9 crore and negative ₹48.8 crore against three years of reported profit of ₹28.6 crore (T1). Borrowings are ₹165 crore against equity of ₹63 crore, a debt to equity of 2.61 times, and almost all of the increase is short-term bank limits funding a lengthening stock and receivables cycle (T1). Part of the funding is family money: ₹18.7 crore of the company's ₹20.1 crore of unsecured loans is owed to the promoters' own investment companies at 9% and repayable on demand, the largest single line being ₹16.2 crore, slightly more than a full year's profit (T1, RHP p.255). The offer has no working capital object at all. It repays ₹10 crore, about 6% of the debt, and the filing states plainly that no part of the proceeds will fund working capital, so the thing consuming the cash still has to be financed by lenders.
- Edge: nothing in the filing says why a customer picks this company, and the growth came from other people's assets. Owned capacity has not grown since 2021. Every extra tonne in the record came from the leased plant of the noticed entity, which is 22% of installed capacity on an eleven-month licence, and from bought-in woven fabric: purchases of finished PP woven fabric went from ₹2.5 crore to ₹63.2 crore in two years and are now 38% of everything the factories consume, with no supplier, no tonnage and no price disclosed anywhere in the document, and no risk factor written about it (T1, RHP p.153). The company's own competition paragraph says price and quality decide most orders. Five promoter-controlled companies operate in the same trade inside the same freight radius under a non-compete that carves up geographies and customers, which a minority shareholder cannot see or enforce. And the filing's own peer table shows RDB Rasayans, a Kolkata woven-sack maker at one third of the revenue, earning an 18.28% EBITDA margin and 18.47% return on capital against Injecto's 10.13% and 15.64% (T1, RHP p.128). The company does not own the profit pool of its own segment.
Valuation at the band
| Floor ₹98 (T1) | Cap ₹100 (T1) | |
|---|---|---|
| Bid window | 11 to 16 September 2026 | |
| Bid lot | 1,200 shares, minimum two lots (T1) | |
| Fresh shares | 56,12,400, fixed in the filing (T1) | |
| Post-issue shares | 2,07,89,600 | 2,07,89,600 |
| Money raised | ₹55 cr | ₹56 cr |
| Market capitalisation | ₹204 cr | ₹208 cr |
| P/E (FY26 profit) | 12.7x | 13.0x |
| EV/EBITDA (reported net debt) | 9.5x | 9.6x |
| EV/EBITDA (illustrative, net of the ₹10 cr earmarked repayment) | 9.3x | 9.4x |
| Promoter holding after | 54.00% | 54.00% |
The filing's own Basis for Offer Price table puts peer price to earnings at 17.97 highest, 8.22 lowest and 13.06 average (T1, RHP p.123), so on the full post-issue share count the cap prices this company a shade under the average of the two peers it chose for itself. The price does not move the verdict: the six ratings judge the business and the shape of the offer, not what is being asked for it.
The story
A buyer here is buying a Kolkata converter of polypropylene woven fabric and sacks that has trebled its revenue in two years, but only half of that revenue is conversion. The other half is a granule and PVC resin trading book that earns a quarter of the manufacturing margin and is getting thinner, and more than a third of what the factories themselves consume is now fabric bought in finished from someone the filing never names.
What this business is
Injecto makes woven sacks and fabric out of plastic granules. Granules are melted and drawn into flat tape, the tape is woven into fabric on circular looms, and the fabric is laminated, printed, cut and stitched into bags. Those bags carry cement, fertiliser, food grain, sugar and chemicals. It runs two plants near Howrah in West Bengal, Unit-I which it owns and Unit-II which it rents from a promoter-group company, and it sells almost entirely close to home: 85.3% of revenue comes from West Bengal and another 7.0% from other eastern states (T1, RHP p.24). The top five customers are 30.5% of revenue (T1, RHP p.157).
Alongside the factories it buys and resells plastic granules and PVC resin without processing them. That trading book was 28% of revenue two years ago and is 50% now. It earns 6.9% gross margin against 28.0% in manufacturing, and the company itself describes it as low margin with low barriers to entry.
The third piece is the one the filing does not discuss. Rather than weave all its own fabric, the company buys finished woven fabric and feeds it into the later stages, lamination and stitching. That purchase was ₹63.2 crore in the year to March 2026, 38% of total manufacturing raw material, and it sits inside the raw material table rather than the traded-goods schedule, so it is converted and not resold. The counted capacity figures measure only the tape plant, which the bought fabric bypasses. This is why reported production fell 0.65% in a year manufacturing revenue rose 52.3%.
Easy or difficult business? Run-of-the-mill. Extruding tape and weaving sacks is standard equipment and standard practice, there is no approval a competitor cannot get, and the company concedes that price and quality decide most orders. The two genuine advantages are freight, because a cheap bulky product is expensive to truck and eastern India has few converters, and the balance sheet needed to hold four months of stock. Neither is owned exclusively: five family companies trade the same commodity in the same region.
Key numbers
| ₹ cr | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 109.0 | 261.5 | 375.5 |
| Revenue growth % | n/a | 139.8 | 43.6 |
| EBITDA | 12.3 | 22.6 | 38.0 |
| EBITDA margin % | 11.3 | 8.6 | 10.1 |
| PAT | 4.4 | 8.1 | 16.0 |
| PAT growth % | n/a | 82.5 | 97.5 |
| Operating cash flow | -13.0 | -16.9 | -48.8 |
| Total borrowings | 83.4 | 101.1 | 165.2 |
Profit grew more than twice as fast as revenue in the latest year for two reasons, both visible in the profit and loss account. Other expenses rose only 6.0%, from ₹21.9 crore to ₹23.2 crore, while gross profit rose 40%, which took EBITDA up 68.6%. Interest then rose 30% against that, so pre-tax profit doubled (T1). Blended gross margin still fell almost seven points over the two years, from 24.4% to 17.4%, and that is mix rather than decay: manufacturing margin held near 28% while the thin trading book went from a quarter of revenue to half of it.
| Segment, ₹ cr | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Manufacturing revenue | 78.9 | 122.4 | 186.4 |
| Manufacturing growth % | n/a | 55.1 | 52.3 |
| Trading revenue (granules and PVC resin) | 30.2 | 139.1 | 189.1 |
| Trading growth % | n/a | 361.3 | 36.0 |
| Manufacturing gross profit | 23.1 | 35.9 | 52.2 |
| Manufacturing gross margin % | 29.3 | 29.3 | 28.0 |
| Trading gross profit | 3.4 | 10.7 | 13.0 |
| Trading gross margin % | 11.4 | 7.7 | 6.9 |
| Bought-in woven fabric, inside manufacturing cost | 2.5 | 23.6 | 63.2 |
| Total manufacturing raw material | 48.4 | 116.0 | 165.3 |
Segment revenue and the raw material split are the filing's own certified tables (T1, RHP p.153, p.156). Segment profit is not disclosed; the gross profit lines above are rebuilt from the two cost stacks in the profit and loss account and reconcile exactly to the reported totals and to the company's own EBITDA in all three years (T1).
Scorecard
| Block | Rating | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Right to win | MARGINAL | Two things keep this off the floor. The locational argument is a real mechanism rather than a slogan: sacks are bulky and cheap, freight decides delivered cost, eastern India holds little of the national converting base (T3), and 92% of revenue comes from inside that region (T1). And the conversion business has performed: its own gross profit grew 125.7% in two years with the margin held near 28% (T1), while the sector grew 5 to 6% and the two listed woven-sack peers grew 12 to 17% (T2 and T3), so the gain is share rather than a price tide. Three things stop it going higher, and two more sit underneath. The filing contradicts its own relationship and customisation claims by saying price and quality decide most orders. The regional position is shared with five promoter companies in the same trade under a non-compete a minority shareholder cannot read or enforce. And the expansion this IPO funds is aimed at regions where the freight logic runs against the company, which the filing says itself. Owned capacity has not grown since 2021, the growth came from a leased promoter plant and bought-in fabric, and the nearest same-product peer earns nearly twice the EBITDA margin at a third of the size. A reason is asserted; the filing does not demonstrate it. |
| Industry and TAM | MARGINAL | The market is real and the runway is not the constraint, about 3.4 million tonnes of polymer a year (T3) against 18,070 tonnes of capacity after expansion (T1); but the filing claims 22 to 25% growth where the sector grows 5 to 6% (T3), and its own numbers show like-for-like output down 4.3%, its largest customer down 12.7% and its nearest Kolkata peer down 20.6% in the same year. |
| Financial momentum | MARGINAL | Revenue and profit up 3.4 and 3.6 times in two years on genuine volume, with returns on capital rising to 15.5% against a 9.9% cost of debt (T1); against that, three years of negative operating cash flow, a mix shift into a thinning trading book and a third of manufacturing revenue backed by fabric the company did not weave. |
| Risks, governance, RPTs | FAIL | The promoter is personally a noticee in a ₹21.27 crore fake-invoicing proceeding centred on the company that is simultaneously Injecto's landlord, its largest related-party customer last year and the owner of the property securing its bank lines. |
| Promoter and cap table | MARGINAL | Money has gone in and not out: no shares sold, nothing pledged, ₹10 crore of the promoter's own cash paid for a family stake, family lending to the company rather than the reverse (T1); set against a promoter whose record outside the company is unresolved and half the company held through five interlocking family finance vehicles. |
| Offer structure | PASS | All fresh money, no selling shareholder, named objects down to individual lenders and machines, general corporate purposes capped at 15%, and no promoter debt repaid out of proceeds. |
Watch out for
- What could not be established, stated plainly. We could not establish whether Injecto Polymers is one of the fifteen companies said to have received the disputed invoices. The filing gives the number fifteen and does not name them, and notices of this kind are not published in India, so there is no public way to find out. Our research established that the question cannot be answered from outside sources, not that the answer is no. This assessment is graded without it. Two things belong beside that limit. The company is not itself a noticee today, and a notice served on it would have to appear in its own litigation table, which lists three GST matters and none of them this one (T1). And it bought ₹19.27 crore of granules from the noticed entity in the year to March 2025, inside the window the notice covers, in the commodity the notice concerns (T1).
- A FAIL on governance is not the same as a red flag, and this page carries no red flag. No regulator or exchange has acted against the promoters, there is no past fraud finding, no criminal case, and no shares are pledged. The change of auditor in June 2025 was checked and came back ordinary: a ten-day replacement by a peer-reviewed firm, clean opinions on both sides, and one correction for gratuity worth about half a percent of one year's pre-tax profit (T1). The bad answer in this block comes from live proceedings, not from a history.
- The landlord company stopped answering its credit rating agency. Hind Polyfabs was marked "Issuer Not Cooperating" by CRISIL from December 2022 and its rating was withdrawn in April 2024 after three unanswered letters; a second family company was non-cooperating until March 2023 (T2, CRISIL rationales of April and July 2024). Non-cooperation is common among small unlisted Indian firms and is not evidence of wrongdoing. What it shows is that the entities at the centre of the governance finding have a record of not answering outside scrutiny, which is worth knowing before taking the family's assurances about them at face value.
- ₹18 crore of the company's own unsecured loans became 9% of the company at ₹100 a share. In March 2025 eight outside lenders swapped ₹18 crore of loans for debentures and then for 18,00,000 shares, which is 8.66% of the company after this issue, and the filing lists that allotment under shares issued in the last year below the offer price (T1, RHP p.85). The debenture terms were amended three weeks before conversion and the filing never says what changed. Most of those holders have since sold, so this was paper that moved on rather than outside investors backing the business. We checked all eight against the registry and found no connection to the promoter family for any of them, with one exception we could not close: Shiv Towers Private Limited, which has never sold its shares, shares a surname with a promoter's in-law and is separately an unsecured lender to the company, though no first name or directorship overlaps. Settling that needs paid registry filings, so it stays not knowable rather than answered.
- Four months of stock, and no provision against an ageing book. Inventory grew 89% in a year revenue grew 44%, and traded-goods stock alone went from 68 to 122 days of cost, which is a price position in a commodity rather than a working capital need (T1). Receivables older than six months stood at ₹7.3 crore at March 2026, 11.4% of the book, against ₹0.1 crore a year earlier and ₹3.2 crore the year before that, with a nil bad-debt provision in every year (T1).
The offer
- Raising ₹55 crore to ₹56 crore at the band, all of it a fresh issue; there is no offer for sale and no selling shareholder (T1).
- For ₹30.5 crore of new machinery at Unit-I, which lifts capacity 66% to 18,070 tonnes, ₹10 crore to repay two State Bank of India term loans, and the rest to general corporate purposes, capped at the lower of 15% of the raise or ₹10 crore (T1, RHP p.101). No part of it funds working capital, which the filing states expressly.
- Implied valuation: the table above, ₹208 crore at the cap.
- Promoters hold 73.97% before the offer and 54.00% after, 64.3% counting the wider family group. They sell nothing, and no promoter share is pledged (T1).
Assessment from the Red Herring Prospectus dated 7 September 2026, with no outside verification beyond the price band and offer dates, which come from the BSE public record, and a credit rating agency's published rationales on two family companies. Numbers carry source tiers: (T1) the filing's audited and certified sections, (T2) exchange and rating agency records, (T3) press and aggregators, UNVERIFIED where the filing does not support them. Not a recommendation. The valuation section states what the announced band implies and is not a view on whether that price is right.