Why:
- The house is badly run. In FY25 the company paid ₹81 lakh of penalty interest for paying its taxes late, about 16% of that year's profit, and more than its own risk section accounts for (T1). It filed 19 company-law forms late, some by over a year, bought several state labour registrations in the very month it filed the DRHP, lost two auditors in three years, and had three audit qualifications in FY24, including foreign-exchange losses that were simply never recorded (T1).
- ₹2.86 crore of company cash sits with the two promoters, and nobody says why. It went out in the six months before filing, interest-free, described only as a "capital advance" and an "imprest" to be settled within a year (T1). It is 21% of the company's net worth, and without it the half-year's operating cash flow would have been roughly zero instead of ₹2.6 crore negative.
- Half the revenue is one unnamed banking or insurance client, on no contract. The top client was 63% of revenue in FY24 and 52% in the latest half; the one big growth year was essentially that account arriving (T1). Every job is won by pitch, and the client owes the company nothing beyond the current purchase order.
The story
Eventions is a 33-person Gurgaon agency that runs corporate conferences and incentive trips, at home and abroad, mostly for banks and insurers. It bills the whole event through its books and keeps 16 to 17 paise per rupee, up from 9 paise two years ago. A buyer of this IPO is buying that margin gain plus a working-capital war chest, tied to one dominant client. This is a read of the draft filing only: there is no price band, no offer dates, and the audited numbers stop at 30 September 2025. Five months after filing, NSE's records show no approval, no updated filing and no withdrawal.
What this business is
The company organises MICE programs, meaning meetings, incentives, conferences and exhibitions. A bank wants to fly 300 top agents to Barcelona: Eventions books the hotels, flights, visas, venues and production, runs the event on site, and bills the client for the lot. It owns no venues and almost no assets, pays vendors in advance, and collects from clients after the event. Revenue went from ₹42 crore in FY23 to ₹87 crore in FY24 and has stayed there since; profit kept rising because the cost of buying event inputs fell from 91% of revenue to 84% (T1). About nine rupees in ten come from the insurance and banking vertical, and over half from a single client the filing never names (T1).
Easy or difficult business? Mostly run-of-the-mill, by the filing's own admission: low entry barriers, a fragmented market, work won event by event on price and pitch, no long-term contracts (T1). The one genuinely harder part is long-haul international incentive programs across ten countries, which the company demonstrably delivers, nine such events in its best year (T1). That is a capability, not a barrier.
Key numbers
| ₹ cr | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 41.6 | 86.6 | 87.5 |
| Revenue growth % | n/a | 108.1 | 1.1 |
| Gross margin % | 9.1 | 9.0 | 16.0 |
| EBITDA | 1.8 | 4.1 | 7.1 |
| EBITDA margin % | 4.3 | 4.8 | 8.1 |
| PAT | 1.4 | 3.3 | 5.1 |
| PAT growth % | n/a | 136.4 | 56.0 |
Profit grew far faster than revenue, and the whole gap is one line: the cost of buying event inputs fell from 91% of revenue to 84% in FY25 (T1). The filing credits better vendor buying, and its supplier tables do show purchasing spread across more vendors at better terms (T1). Listed peers keep 14 to 26 paise per rupee, so the new 16 to 17 is normal for the trade and the old 9 was the outlier (T2). What no one can check is whether it holds: the line is disclosed as a single undivided number, and there is almost no fixed-cost cushion under it, so a reversal would take most of the profit with it. The six months to September 2025 brought ₹43.4 crore of revenue and ₹3.2 crore of profit at a still-higher margin, seasonally ahead of both listed peers' half-year pace (T1).
| Service line, ₹ cr | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| MICE | 24.8 | 75.7 | 80.3 |
| MICE growth % | n/a | 205.6 | 6.2 |
| Events | 16.8 | 10.1 | 6.5 |
| Events growth % | n/a | -39.8 | -35.8 |
| FIT and others | 0.1 | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| FIT and others growth % | n/a | 1,383.6 | -11.4 |
MICE is the company: 92% of FY25 revenue. In the latest half Events revived, with ₹7.3 crore in six months beating all of FY25, while MICE ran at ₹36.0 crore (T1). The small FIT leisure-travel line has been moved into a loss-making subsidiary.
Scorecard
| Block | Rating | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Right to win | MARGINAL | The customer's reason to pick Eventions is never stated and hard to find: the filing itself calls the market low-barrier, fragmented and price-competitive, with no contracts and no order book. What the numbers do show is real capability: the retained margin, the money the company actually keeps, doubled in FY24 and nearly doubled again in FY25, returns on capital lead both listed peers in every period, ten countries delivered, and the client list broadened in the latest half from 9 to 12 with concentration falling (T1). Against that, the growth record decomposes badly: the banking and insurance vertical supplied more than all of FY24's doubling, the top client has shrunk for two straight periods, and the planned second act, a consumer travel app built by outside contractors for a subsidiary with no engineers, has no credible path (T1). Real operator, no moat, one client. |
| Industry and TAM | MARGINAL | Runway is real: about 0.2% share of even the narrowest market reading, thousands of corporate buyers untouched (T1/T3). But the forces are ugly: low entry barriers, extreme buyer power, thin pass-through economics, and the filing names not one competitor and gives no market share for anyone. |
| Financial momentum | MARGINAL | Margins and profit genuinely improving, and audited across two consecutive periods. But revenue has been flat for two and a half years, and 3.5 years of ₹13 crore reported profit produced negative operating cash flow, ending September 2025 with ₹2,000 in the bank; receivables, advances and prepaid balances now roughly equal the company's entire net worth (T1). |
| Risks, governance, RPTs | FAIL | ₹81 lakh of penalty interest on late taxes in one year, 240 late statutory payments, 19 late filings, a live Companies Act violation self-reported on the DRHP date, two auditor exits, three FY24 audit qualifications, registrations bought in the filing month (T1). Litigation itself is small, about ₹2.3 crore all-in, mostly the promoter's personal GST disputes (T1). |
| Promoter and cap table | MARGINAL | Two founders built a real ₹87 crore business on ₹50 lakh of shareholder cash, sell nothing here, pledge nothing, and have a clean share count with no ESOP overhang (T1). But ₹2.86 crore of company cash sits with them unexplained, the brand and domain belonged to the promoter personally until three weeks before filing, a same-name proprietorship of his still exists in a similar line, promoter pay jumped 7x in FY25 with no cap disclosed, and no outsider has ever bought a share at any price (T1/T2). |
| Offer structure | MARGINAL | All fresh money, nobody selling, general purposes capped: structurally clean. But 94% of the named ₹25.4 crore funds the existing working-capital cycle rather than anything new, the debt being repaid nearly doubled in the six months before filing, and repaying the overdraft releases the promoter's house and personal guarantees that secure it (T1). |
Watch out for
- The filing has gone quiet. Five months after the DRHP, NSE's records show no in-principle approval, no observations, no RHP, no price band, and no withdrawal (T1). We checked and found nothing either way; that is itself worth knowing.
- The ₹2.86 crore with the promoters is the item to re-check first at any RHP. If the next filing does not name the asset behind the ₹2.22 crore "capital advance", or the money is still out past September 2026, or any of it is written off or grows, this stops being a housekeeping question (T1).
- The margin is the thesis, and it cannot be verified. If the 16 to 17% take reverts toward the old 9%, there is no fixed-cost cushion and profit roughly vanishes. Peer levels say the new margin is normal; peer history says such margins swing 3 to 5 points a year on mix (T2).
- The business is older than the company, and the filing does not bridge them. The trademark was the promoter's personally from 2019, the domain dates to 2012, and his same-name proprietorship traded for years before incorporation in December 2020, so the from-scratch growth story cannot be cleanly attributed (T1/T2). Outside checks found a real operating reputation but no independent editorial coverage at all; the headline industry award is a sponsored trade prize (T2/T3).
- A third of the latest half's revenue had not been invoiced yet. Unbilled revenue reached 31.7% of six-month revenue, with no provision for doubtful debts anywhere (T1).
The offer
- Raising money through a fresh issue of 32.3 lakh new shares only; no one is selling. The rupee size does not exist yet because there is no price band; the named uses total ₹25.4 crore (T1).
- For repaying ₹7 crore of loans, including the overdraft secured on the promoter's house, lending ₹1.4 crore to the consumer travel-app subsidiary bought from the promoters three weeks before filing, and ₹17 crore of working capital (T1).
- Implied valuation: none exists. The only recent transaction is the promoters' own share swap at ₹15.55 per share three weeks before filing, on 0.5% of the shares, which would value the company near ₹14 crore, about 2.7x FY25 earnings; a promoter-to-promoter paper deal, not a market price (T1).
- Promoters hold 98.98% before the offer, roughly 73% after, and take nothing off the table (T1).
Assessment of the Draft Red Herring Prospectus dated 31 March 2026 under the orchestrated process. This is a DRHP-stage read on request: no price band or offer dates exist, and the audited numbers stop at 30 September 2025. Outside checks of listed-peer margins, the company's public footprint and the filing's status with NSE were made and are marked where used. Numbers carry source tiers: (T1) the filing's audited sections or exchange records, (T2) established outside sources with a named source, (T3) trade press or the filing's quoted third-party figures. Not a recommendation. No price exists at this stage, so nothing here is a valuation view.